Security
Privacy is an architecture constraint.
SANN is designed to limit what a service receives and what our servers can read. This page distinguishes plaintext identity data, encrypted messages and the metadata needed to operate the service.
Data and storage
- Personal numbers, names and documents A personal number is seen in memory during verification, then forgotten. It is never written to a database, a log or a backup. Zero stored — not zero seen.
- Message content Personal conversations are encrypted on the sender’s device. The relay stores encrypted messages for delivery and synchronization without holding the conversation keys. Deletion follows a bounded retention policy and the delivery state of subscribed devices. Managed organisation inboxes are a separate case, explained below.
- Your username in the clear Usernames are stored hashed for lookup and encrypted for display to their owner.
What a service receives
A service that adds Continue with SANN gets a pairwise identifier that is different for every service, and signed answers to the questions the user approved — encrypted to that service’s own key. Services do not receive a shared SANN identifier for correlating a person. This does not prevent correlation through information they obtain independently. Information disclosed to a service is governed by the permission you grant; encryption does not remove that service’s responsibility for the information it receives.
Keys and recovery
- Keys live on your devices Private keys use platform-protected storage and local data is encrypted at rest. Protection depends on the key type and platform; this does not mean every key is non-exportable or permanently hardware-bound. Cryptography is implemented in a shared core.
- One recovery key is the account There is no password reset, no support back door and no identity check that can hand an account to someone else. Lose the recovery key and the account is gone. That is deliberate.
- Devices are added and removed cryptographically A new device joins with a code scanned by a device you already hold. Removing one is a cryptographic operation inside each conversation, not a flag on a server.
Organisations’ inboxes
A club or company reaches its members through an inbox in the app. It chooses once where the inbox keys live: on its own people’s phones, where no server can read anything, or with SANN’s inbox service, which then holds the keys and can read that inbox. Members see which model their organisation chose, and can compare the inbox’s fingerprint with the one the organisation publishes.
Where it runs
A Swedish company, SANN Everyday AB (org.nr 559606-9434, D-U-N-S® 317661786), on Swedish infrastructure under Swedish law, with two documented exceptions: hardware key custody in a Swiss security module and edge delivery through Cloudflare. No certification is claimed; the controls are designed to meet SOC 2 and ISO 27001 and will be audited when the service is ready for general availability.
Status
SANN is available by invitation. The architecture guides development; general availability requires further verification and independent review. This description is not a certification or a guarantee that every risk has been eliminated.
Report a security issue
Contact hello@sann.com with the affected address or product, a short description and steps to reproduce. Start without sensitive information so we can agree how to share further details.
Test only with your own accounts and data. Avoid disrupting services or accessing other people's information. This page does not grant general authorization to test systems or promise a reward or response deadline.
Last reviewed: 26 October 2026. Website privacy.